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Abstract
The Soviet background to the idea of primary socialist accumulation is
presented. The mobilisations of labour power and of products into
public sector investment from outside are shown to have been the two
original forms of the concept. In Soviet primary accumulation the
mobilisation of labour power was apparently more decisive than the
mobilisation of products. The primary accumulation process had both
intended and unintended results. Intended results included bringing
most of the economy into the public sector, and industrialisation of the
economy as a whole. Unintended results included substantial economic
losses, and the proliferation of coercive institutions damaging to
attainment of the ultimate goal -the building of a communist society.
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Primary Accumulation in the Soviet
Transition
“The more backward economically … a particular country is
which has gone over to the socialist organisation of production,
… by so much more, in proportion, will socialist accumulation be
obliged to rely on alienating part of the surplus product of pre-
socialist forms of economy and … the less will it be nourished by
the surplus product of the workers in socialist industry” (E. A.
Preobrazhensky).
I. Introduction
What do we mean by primary accumulation in societies attempting the
reorganisation of economic life on socialist lines? Since the term
“primary socialist accumulation” was originated in the Soviet Union,
and Soviet experience provides the first case of such an attempt, our
answer to this question is naturally coloured by our opinions about
Soviet history, especially those received from the figures which have
populated it. These opinions cannot be evaluated, and our question
cannot be answered, without first undertaking a review of the historical
background against which the concept of primary socialist
accumulation first arose.
II. Background
The Soviet Union of the 1920s possessed a new kind of “mixed”
economy. The mixture was a direct result of the way in which the Soviet
regime had appropriated its economic legacy bequeathed from the pre-
revolutionary era. Before 1917 Russia had been the least industrialised
of the great powers or the most industrially developed of the world’s
primary producing and exporting nations. Her economy had been
organised by means of a combination of feudal, capitalist and state-
capitalist forms, one result of which was a pervasive dualism. In
industry and trade a limited number of giant cartels (among them, the
first modern transnational companies) operated alongside hundreds of
thousands of artisan producers and market traders. In agriculture,
which accounted for over half of 1913 national income and at least 70
per cent of employment [Gregory, 1972:425; 1982:132-5], big latifundia
ran side by side with 16 million peasant farms. Spontaneous forces for
economic development flowed in a confused stream, sometimes with
and sometimes against the currents deliberately induced by
government and monopoly capital [e.g. Crisp, 1976: 52-4].
The transformations enacted as a result of Russia’s revolutions and
civil war brought radical change to this economic structure. Large-scale
industry and finance entered the public sector in 1917-18. Small
industries, closed or nationalised in 1918-20, were revived and
returned to the private sector after the New Economic Policy (NEP) was
initiated in 1921. The state became a monopoly supplier of industrial
capital goods, of formal credit and of imports; a dominant agent in the
2supply of manufactured goods to the retail market, and the most
important purchaser of grain from the agricultural producer. In
agriculture itself the old dualistic structure was swept away by
incorporation of latifundia into the economy of the small producers;
public enterprise was introduced but remained vestigial, more than 98
per cent of sown area being maintained on small peasant farms [Nove,
1982:102-6]. Pronounced levelling tendencies within the peasantry had
the further result that small capitalism was greatly weakened; in the
mid-1920s, of 20 million peasant farms, only three-quarters of a
million could be thought of as reliant on hired labour [Danilov, 1977:
57].
In the Soviet economy as a whole the public sector, even including
cooperative enterprises, was therefore comparatively small. It
accounted for all banking (that is, formal credit institutions, but not
petty rural credit) and foreign trade, three-quarters of industrial output
(but a substantially smaller fraction of industrial employment), most of
wholesale and from half to two-thirds of retail trade, but it played
practically no part in agricultural production. Moreover, agriculture
remained the dominant sector of the economy in terms of both national
income and employment shares.
Should we identify the quantitative role of an economy’s public
sector with the degree of its socialisation? The existence of a public
sector may well be a necessary condition for establishing social
ownership and control of an economy, but it is clearly not sufficient.
Nor is it necessarily the case that an increase in the degree of social
control requires an increase in the share of the public sector under all
circumstances.1 If the public sector in the Soviet economy of the 1920s
was limited in size, was the degree of socialisation correspondingly
low?
From the point of view of the managerial relations of production,
work in the public sector was still organised on hierarchical,
authoritarian lines. The voices of workers’ direct control and elective
self-management, once prominent both in the factory and on the left of
the Soviet regime, had been stilled during the struggle for unanimity
around the Bolshevik leadership which had attended the revolutionary
process and civil war. It is true that both hierarchy and authority were
far less pronounced than in the pre-revolutionary workplace, and
workers’ representatives now occupied an indispensable place in the
management structure. Soviet trade unions, however, were in the
process of assuming a more centralised and disciplined form.
In the private sector (mainly in agriculture and trade), the
revolution had injected both communal and co-operative forms with
new life. The whip hand of the bailiff had been struck aside and the fist
of the kulak (the small capitalist farmer or moneylender) relaxed. But
the extent to which such new freedoms could be made the
preconditions for new kinds of real social ownership and control was
1 The distinction between public and social ownership owes much to
the work of Polish economists dating back to the 1950s and 1960s. See,
for example, Brus [1975: 18-24].
3very much an open question given the small-scale, in part self-
sufficient, character of production.
From the point of view of establishing social control over the
macroeconomic system, the regime possessed - in principle - a wide
array of policy instruments and direct controls. These ranged from the
control of credit, taxation and foreign trade to the direct regulation of
public sector output, prices and employment. Translating these
apparent powers into effective authority, capable of realising objectives
laid down in advance while remaining sensitive to the new difficulties
and demands which would emerge only in the course of economic
development, was another matter. The regime was characterised by
self-confessed “bureaucratic deformations” - maladministration,
illiteracy, corruption, authoritarianism. Whether or not the regime
itself was subject to control by society is a related question (involving
the character of Soviet society as much as that of the regime) which can
scarcely be resolved here. But it can be said that here was a regime in
which controls and prohibitions wielded over the heads of the
population were offset to some degree by many innovative participatory
forms and channels for popular expression — at this stage, even of
some dissent — so that the answer is unlikely to be categorical; even a
qualified “yes” or “no” might not suffice.
To what extent did the performance of this economic system match
the needs of Soviet society? In the 1920s the Soviet economy expanded
rapidly and evolved dynamically. This growth has been evaluated in
relation to the level and rate of economic development achieved before
1914. Between 1914 and 1921 the economy suffered a terrible blow.
Agricultural production fell by a third and industry was virtually closed
down. By 1920 trade had ceased or been driven underground, being
replaced by black markets, barter, administrative rationing and
requisition. Empty factories and uncultivated land meant that, by the
post-war period, in spite of the premature death or disablement of
millions of citizens, the Soviet economy possessed substantial reserves
of unutilised capacity. The pre-war level of output achieved within
post-war frontiers is often taken, therefore, as a benchmark for the
restoration of Soviet economic activity. In the view of the Birmingham
Soviet Industrialisation Project researchers, by 1926/7 Soviet industrial
production was already from two per cent to six per cent higher than in
1913 [ Wheatcroft, Davies and Cooper, 1982: 3]. In agriculture grain
harvests lagged behind - only in the best year, 1926, was the 1909-13
average matched, and this was still 15 per cent below the pre-war best
of 1913. But, even in 1926, grains accounted for less than one-quarter
(by value) of gross agricultural production. Moreover, the grain
deficiency was more than offset by a shift to mixed farming with more
intensive arable crops and livestock. By 1926, agricultural output as a
whole had just matched or exceeded (by one-half to two per cent) the
41913 benchmark [Wheatcroft, Davies and Cooper, 1982: 3-4;
Wheatcroft, 1984: 45-7].2
In terms of its rate of development the NEP economy also compared
favourably with historical precedents. After post-war recovery
agriculture continued expansion only at a sluggish rate, ceasing after
1928, but within the aggregate the pattern continued to improve. The
traditional grain monoculture was giving way to improved livestock and
intensive arable crops. Livestock herds were growing at three per cent
to four per cent per annum compared to the 1890-1913 average of less
than two per cent [Danilov, 1977: 277-301]. Meanwhile large-scale
industrial production was expanding at a rate substantially higher than
that established by the pre-war trend, and was even accelerating as it
passed the level of the 1913 benchmark, reaching more than 20 per cent
over the previous year in 1927/8 and 1928/9. However, small
industries stagnated [Carr and Davies, 1974: 1004].
Assessment of overall growth rates is rendered complex by the need
to allow for the element of recommissioning existing capacity which
had been temporarily closed down during the war years. This element
was still present in the late 1920s, even after pre-war output levels had
been surpassed, and helps to explain the rapidity of industrial growth.
However, the restoration of existing capacity was certainly not the only
explanation for the dynamism of the NEP economy. By 1926/7 net
industrial investment was at least 20 per cent higher than in 1913, and
large-scale industrial fixed capacity was growing at more than 13 per
cent per annum. In agriculture investment in livestock in 1926/7 was
no less than three-and-a-half times the 1913 level. But these gains were
largely at the expense of investment in urban housing and farm
buildings, so that net investment in the economy as a whole had not
quite recovered to the 1913 level [Wheatcroft, Davies and Cooper, 1982:
5-6]. All the same the mobilisation of existing capacities, and of
investment resources for the creation of new capacities within NEP was
sufficiently impressive that the “replacement crisis” feared by many, in
which the productive assets acquired from the pre-revolutionary era
would wear out and leave behind them a declining economy, did not
materialise.
To what extent did this pattern of accumulation meet social and
governmental aspirations? Under NEP the peasantry enjoyed major
benefits. Following the expulsion of the landlords and breakdown of
the rural state apparatus they commanded a much higher proportion of
the land and other agricultural assets than before the revolution and,
with the sharp decline in their compulsory obligations, they retained a
bigger share of what they produced [Barsov, 1969: 70-71]?3 Out of
2 This assessment is more optimistic than that of Gregory [1982:
Chapter 5 ] concerning which the Birmingham authors express
reservations.
3 The most famous comment on this phenomenon is found in the
use made by Stalin of statistics on grain production and marketings in
1926/7, produced by the economist V. S. Nemchinov, in a speech in
5increased retentions they were able both to invest more and to eat
better. Farming became a healthier profession both from a production
and from a consumption point of view. The urban strata, especially the
workers, were placed in a more ambiguous position, since food
shortages constantly threatened living standards, job creation and
other gains of the October 1917 revolution. By the late 1920s ambitious
investment programmes for public sector industries were tending to
outrun the supply of investment goods available, and to stimulate
consumer demand faster than new capacity could be created. Resulting
shortages of manufactured consumer goods were also damaging to
urban food supplies, since food producers preferred to retain
marketable output rather than exchange it for cash which could not be
spent (for accounts of the “goods famine” see Davies [1980: 39] and
Nove [1982:139-40]). Moreover, public sector investment plans,
although ambitious in relation to the economy’s ability to supply them,
were too small in relation to the regime’s perception of investment
needs. In the outturn, when scarce investment goods were rationed
among competing public sector claimants according to a crude priority
system, major sectors such as education, housing, transport and the
defence industries were starved of new assets [ Wheatcroft, Davies and
Cooper, 1982: 7]. Thus although the NEP economy expanded rapidly
and evolved dynamically, its evolution was neither harmonious nor
unforced.
The fullest implications of these dilemmas are revealed when we
place the NEP economy in its international setting. Historically Russia
had depended on the West for the import of both savings and industrial
technology. The Soviet regime was learning to substitute domestic for
foreign savings, but at the cost of growing internal disequilibrium. It
was proving just as difficult to create domestic sources of machinery for
efficient, resource-saving innovation. At the same time the resource
cost of imported machinery was growing, because there was less grain
available for export, while in the world market the terms of trade were
shifting decisively against primary producers. The range of external
military threats was widening as the gains from trade diminished.
Could NEP have been maintained in spite of these difficulties?
Elsewhere I have written that the NEP economy might have yielded
continued economic expansion with less industrial growth, more
agricultural revolution and more attention to living standards than
were obtained under Stalinist industrialisation after 1929. But in
following this alternative just as many problems would have arisen as
were actually faced and resolved, suppressed or deferred under Stalin.
For some this means that effectively there was no alternative to
Stalinist industrialisation [e.g. Vyas, 1978:160-74; 1985 (forthcoming)].
Certainly, not all the preconditions were already in place for building a
viable, defensible socialist economy along NEP lines. My conclusion is
that the continuation of NEP was a real option, but we cannot say with
hindsight that it would have led to a more humane or prosperous world
[Harrison, 1981-82: 403-4; 1984: 73-4].
April 1928, to argue the case for collectivisation; see Stalin [1940: 208
(“On the Grain Front”)].
6The actual outcome was that NEP was abandoned in 1929 in order
to safeguard the ambitious public sector investment programme.
Forced rapid industrialisation had already begun, and the decisive
phase of farm collectivisation followed rapidly. This process has
sometimes been referred to as one of “primary socialist accumulation.”
What did this mean in theory, and does the theory match what
happened in history? These are questions to which we may now turn.
III. Concepts
Originally, “primary socialist accumulation” formed part of the
theoretical system of left-wing Bolshevism. The term was coined by V.
M. Smirnov in 1920, and was immediately taken up by N. I. Bukharin
[1967:93 (“Ekonomika perekhodnogo perioda”)]. However, its most
famous exponent in the years 1924-26 became the economist and
spokesman for the Trotskyist opposition, E. A. Preobrazhensky.4
(Meanwhile, Bukharin had changed his views and had become a
trenchant critic of the left.) Although they differed in important
respects from the start, these writers gave to the term “primary socialist
accumulation” a clearly discernible common meaning. It meant the
transfer of resources from pre-socialist forms of production into the
socialist sector of the economy. The resources transferred would
finance accumulation within socialist relations of production. Socialist
accumulation was held to be a special problem in a less developed
economy, because initial acts of nationalisation of a few large-scale
enterprises would result in only a small public-sector enclave within the
economy as a whole; the latter would remain dominated by small
capitalists and peasant producers and traders. The socialist sector
would be unable to develop autonomously either in national terms
(because of the need to attract foodstuffs, raw materials and labour
power from the private sector), or in world terms (because of the
competitive dominance of more industrially developed capitalist
nations). Hence the need for a primary phase of accumulation in which
the socialist sector would expand by means of a net transfer of
resources from the private sector and, to this extent, at its expense.
The concept of primary socialist accumulation marked an important
step forward in Marxist political economy. This was because it tended
to challenge the idea that socialisation of the economy requires nothing
more than a series of acts of expropriation or nationalisation. Instead it
suggested that the transition to socialism only begins with the creation
of a public sector; this is followed by a possibly lengthy evolutionary
process within which the transition to socialism must be managed by
means of policy choices, policy instruments and management
institutions. Here was a major discovery.
At the same time, with the help of hindsight, we can isolate three
major defects in this original concept. First was an unquestioned
4 Preobrazhensky’s law of primary socialist accumulation, first
formulated in 1924, can be found in English translation in
Preobrazhensky [1965: Chapter 2 (“The Law of Primitive Socialist
Accumulation”)].
7identification of socialist relations of production with the public sector,
and of state ownership with social ownership and control. However,
even if the creation of a public sector is the start of the socialisation
process, then the process of socialisation which follows cannot be
limited only to the quantitative expansion of the public sector. Also
involved is the qualitative transformation of managerial relations of
production within the public sector. If public sector industries
reproduce capitalist hierarchy and managerial authority, then the
socialisation process has not been advanced thereby. What is more,
socialisation processes need not be confined to the public sector, since
worker initiatives and co-operative or community developments in the
private sector can also challenge and help to transform pre-socialist
relations of production. However, the concept of “primary socialist
accumulation” in its original version paid no attention to these issues
and focused single-mindedly upon accumulation in the public sector,
regardless of the managerial relations of production through which it
would be organised.5
Second, if Bukharin (in 1920) or Preobrazhensky (in 1924-26) had
anything to say about the production relations appropriate to a socialist
transition, it was to define them as centralised and coercive. For
Bukharin [1967: 93-5] this was the consequence of a direct analogy
with primary capitalist accumulation - under capitalism primary
accumulation had been bloody and forced; so too would it be under
socialism, although under socialism the sacrifices and disciplines ought
to be collective and self-imposed. For Preobrazhensky [1965: 120-31],
on the other hand, the analogy was indirect — primary capitalist
accumulation had not just been brutal and bloody but had also
depended to some degree upon the competitive advantage of capitalist
enterprise; however, this advantage would be denied to public
enterprise in a less developed country, so that primary socialist
accumulation could only be organised on the basis of economic and
political monopoly. Thus for each writer the result was the same,
although the reasoning was different -a deterministic model of socialist
production relations in which the general will of the working class
would be realised exclusively through centralised authority and
administrative controls. Within this setting, the socialisation process
was reduced to pumping resources from the private into the public
sector, while the socialist production relations within the public sector
where these resources would be set to work were seen as
predetermined and static.
5 Filtzer [1978: 77-8] has argued that Preobrazhensky recognised
this aspect of primary accumulation in terms of the need to overcome
the division of labour in society (including managerial hierarchy)
through “proletarian democracy” and the appropriation of knowledge
by the working class; Filtzer comments, however, that this aspect of
Preobrazhensky’s theory “fought for a platform which effectively
‘presupposed itself’, in that its prior implementation was an actual
condition for its adoption.”
8The third major defect was that each writer saw primary socialist
accumulation as proceeding along a one-dimensional course, and in
each case the chosen dimension had been generalised from a highly
specific historical conjuncture. For Bukharin [1967: 94; see also
Szamuely, 1974: 41] in 1920, surrounded by the wreckage of war, the
key dimension seemed to be the allocation of labour power. For him,
primary socialist accumulation meant the mobilisation and
militarisation of labour from beyond the ranks of the existing working
class. Conscription of the peasantry into public works would provide
the necessities for industrial reconstruction on socialist lines. Although
popular for a short time (at least among Bolsheviks) this idea was
shelved in 1921 with the relaxation of wartime controls and initiation of
NEP. When Preobrazhensky [1965:91-112] revived “primary socialist
accumulation” in the NEP context, the priorities had changed. Now the
key dimension appeared to be the mobilisation of the agricultural
surplus product and its transfer to public sector industries by means of
direct and indirect taxation of peasant producers. In each case the
result was too much stress on a single aspect of the inter-sectoral
circulation of resources (whether of labour power or of products), to
the detriment of the conceptual inter-relatedness of the economic
system as a whole. Rather than adopt one or another of these versions
of what primary socialist accumulation really meant, it would be
preferable to state that since 1917 Soviet economic development has
passed through several different phases and that in each of them
primary socialist accumulation took a different form.
The precise origins of “primary socialist accumulation” and what its
originators may or may not have intended have recently been discussed
at some length. This all-too-absorbing subject is of some importance to
us, partly because for many years Western economists based their
understanding of the real course of Soviet primary accumulation
processes on a simplified rendering of Preobrazhensky’s prescriptions.
But this basis has been challenged, and major revisions of our
understanding of what happened in history have followed [e.g. Millar,
1970 and 1974; Szamuely, 1974; Ellman, 1975; Millar, 1976 and 1978;
Ellman, 1978; Vyas, 1978 and 1979; Harrison, 1981-82 and
1984; Vyas, 1985].
At the centre of the simplified version was the peasantry as the
principal source of public sector investment funds for Soviet
industrialisation after NEP. The means of primary socialist
accumulation were supposed to have been agricultural products
exchanged by peasants against the industrial outputs of the public
sector at unfavourable terms of trade - the famous price “scissors.”
General secretary I. V. Stalin had adopted (in 1928) the objective of
securing a temporary “tribute” from the peasantry to finance rapid
industrialisation [e.g. Lewin, 1968:258]. By opening the scissors
against the peasant, as Preobrazhensky had recommended, it was held
that the Soviet state had squeezed farm incomes and reduced the ability
of the village to command the outputs of public sector industries. At the
same time the danger that, in response to declining terms of trade, the
peasants would cut back sales of foodstuffs or withdraw from the
market altogether - which Alexander Erlich [1950: 81] called “the
9Preobrazhensky dilemma” - was averted by the policy of farm
collectivisation; this enabled the supply of foodstuffs to be maintained
by means of direct pressure. Thus, according to this view, the peasantry
was the main contributor to primary accumulation, which took the
form of a redistribution of claims on output in favour of public sector
investment; the principal methods of primary accumulation were the
price “scissors” and farm collectivisation.
In reality Soviet primary accumulation did not follow this pattern.
The exchange of commodities between industry and agriculture was not
the sole dimension of primary accumulation, and may not have
provided a source of primary accumulation funds at all. The price
“scissors” proved extremely resistant to manipulation by the public
sector, and their real movement did not follow the course
recommended by Preobrazhensky. Preobrazhensky’s dilemma was
probably not binding, nor was it the decisive stimulus to farm
collectivisation. His concept of “primary socialist accumulation” was
supposed to be the essential precondition for rapid industrialisation
based on the public sector but, even without it, rapid industrialisation
and public sector expansion proceeded anyway. Essential to Soviet
primary accumulation in reality was the fact that managerial relations
of production in the public sector, and the economic system as a whole,
were both being reorganised — just as much as that resources were
being transferred from the private to the public sector. Here there was
more at stake than just a choice among different methods all leading to
a common objective — the construction of a socialist society. Also
involved was a choice among objectives, answering the question: what
kind of socialism?
IV. Objectives and Methods
The Soviet debate over “primary socialist accumulation” may appear to
have been a matter of means, not ends - as though all Bolsheviks held a
roughly shared conception of their ultimate goal, and the discussion
among them was limited to the desirable speed for attaining it and
methods for doing so. Doubtless this was how it appeared at the outset
to those involved. In retrospect, however, we can see that this
distinction between ends and means is too simple. The reality is that
ends and means rarely form a simple hierarchy or are easily separable.
Means must be designed with the end in view; if the objective is not
clearly perceived, then the design of policy will incorporate unforeseen
distortions which may limit or even prevent attainment of the given
goal. Means which turn out not to lead to the designated objective will
have some other outcome instead. When ends and means prove
incompatible it may suddenly transpire that the means are more
precious than the original end, attainment of which is deferred or
abandoned. Of course in many cases there will be several different
routes to the same destination and, under these conditions, the choice
of route will rest primarily on considerations of speed and economy of
effort. But in other circumstances what is apparently a choice of means
to an end will turn out to involve the choice of ends as well. Here
different means incorporate different objectives and may be taken to
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stand for them; they become just as charged with value (or its opposite)
as the goals to which they correspond.
In theory Bolshevism was directed towards a classless society in
which the state was to have “withered away,” coercion being replaced
by voluntary association and co-operative creativity. Yet the
circumstances of international and social conflict prompted the Soviet
regime, from its first moments, to resolute measures of governmental
and social coercion. These measures prompted deep divisions within
Bolshevism. What was at issue was the appropriateness of such
methods on grounds both of expediency (the regime’s survival) and of
principle (the regime’s permanent objective of a socialist society). The
question of expediency was settled in the sense that the regime
survived. The question of principle remained unresolved. Was coercion
a temporary expedient and the state no more than a necessary evil in
the course of struggle for the realisation of human freedom? Or should
Bolsheviks attach a positive value to their refinement and extension?
And if coercive disciplines and authoritarian centralisation were to
become the central themes of Bolshevik practice, what kind of society
would result - a society capable of evolving towards the goals originally
defined, or some more primitive and limited variant, or even a
reversion to something completely antithetical to communist ideals?
It was Bukharin who revealed most clearly the closeness of these
issues to the debate over “primary socialist accumulation.” He had
broken with the left during the period of reassessment immediately
following termination of the civil war, and became a leading exponent
of the theory and practice of NEP as a possible road to socialism. He
criticised both Preobrazhensky’s concept of primary socialist
accumulation and Stalin’s subsequent attempt to secure a temporary
“tribute” from the peasantry - the former on the grounds that it would
require widespread coercion to prevent peasant withdrawal from the
market, losing the goodwill of the peasant masses without whom
socialism could not be built in Russia; the latter because Stalin’s
policies for grain requisitioning initiated in the spring of 1928
amounted to “military-feudal exploitation” of the village [e.g. Cohen,
1975:160-73, 306- 7]. In neither case would the outcome be a socialist
society. At the time, however, the view that these policies were
inappropriate for securing socialist objectives did not prevail.
The Stalinist commitment to coercive methods of authoritarian
management arose in the context of the huge gap between aspirations
and realities. To the new generation of industrial and economic leaders
in the late 1920s backward agrarian Russia appeared to lack all the
prerequisites for a socialist society except one - the Soviet political
system, which was in their hands. Administrative mobilisation of
resources from above became the principal means for realising their
grandiose dreams (although, we shall see, it could not be sustained
indefinitely or remain their sole reliance). The organisers of Stalin’s
“great breakthrough” had little interest in the interaction of plan and
market, or the role of economic signals within an operationally
decentralised public sector. They regarded the market as a seedbed of
economic anarchy or, worse, of capitalist renaissance. Their model of a
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socialist economy was primarily one of physical resource allocation by
decree [Carr and Davies, 1974: Chapter 32].
The main policy determinants of the pace of industrial development
and public sector expansion at the end of NEP were ambitious
investment plans adopted at all economic levels (from central
government down through regional and local government, the
industrial branch and sub-branch down to the enterprise) in the years
1928-30, supplemented by additional directives and decrees. The
supplementary measures were of two kinds — upward revisions of
plans already adopted, and orders designed to protect existing targets
for key sectors (the basic industries, engineering, defence and grain
procurement) against the consequences of shortfalls in supplies which
arose as ambitious plans were implemented [Zaleski, 1971: Chapters3,
4]. Enforcing these orders took the Soviet economy through a gigantic
upsurge. Between 1928 and 1932 under the first Five Year Plan the
Soviet national income (at constant 1928 prices) grew by over 60 per
cent, virtually all the increase taking the form of industrial output for
investment [Barsov, 1969: 90-91].6‘‘ Over 11 million jobs were created
in the public sector (chiefly in large-scale industry and construction)
where employment doubled [Nove, 1982:196]. The weight of the public
sector in the economy also increased sharply. By 1932 it had absorbed
almost all industrial capacity and, if we include co-operatives, more
than three-quarters of agriculture’s sown area [Nove, 1982: 174]; state
procurements accounted for 96 per cent of farmers’ sales [Barsov,
1969: Table 10 (facing p. 112)]. However, the pace of mobilisation of
resources into the public sector and into capital construction was so
rapid that it could not be sustained. Investment projects overstretched
the supply capacity of the industrial system, while production costs
rose. Living standards fell in both town and country. In the village
collectivisation was inducing a profound crisis of the agricultural
system which, after the one good year of 1930, was moving the
population rapidly towards a famine condition. After 1930, economic
expansion was progressively checked, and extensive reorganisations
had to be carried out before rapid mobilisation was resumed in 1934
[e.g. Davies, 1977]. Thereafter the rapidity of economic transformation
in 1928-32 was not repeated (nor, at least in peacetime, was the
severity of the economic crisis which accompanied it). Rather, as the
economy became more industrially developed and more complex,
expansion became more sustained while the cycles became somewhat
less severe.
V. Methods and Results
To what extent did the expansion of public sector investment and
employment depend on squeezing peasant farm incomes through
manipulation of the price “scissors”? Table 1 shows that by 1925/6 the
scissors were as much as 56 per cent less favourable to the peasant than
in 1913, but this was not the result of government policy. Higher
6 Here and below, Soviet national income is measured according to
the Material Product System.
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operating costs in Soviet industry meant that the regime was far more
preoccupied with trying to force down industrial product prices, in
order to squeeze costs and realise reserves of slack capacity, than with
letting them rise in order to squeeze the peasant.
Table 1. The “Scissors,” 1925/6-1928/9
1913 = 100 1925/6 1926/7 1927/8 1928/9
The “scissors” 156 151 137 128
Note: The “scissors” are measured by the ratio of an index of retail
prices of industrial products to an index of planned delivery prices of
agricultural products, based on 1913. Divergences between state
planned delivery prices and free market prices for foodstuffs did not
become substantial until 1928/9.
Source: Carr and Davies [1974: 1024].
Moreover, the immediately subsequent trend favoured the peasant, not
public sector industry - by 1928/9 the adverse shift in the terms of
trade compared to 1913 had been reduced from 55 per cent to 28 per
cent. Retail prices of industrial goods were reduced in 1927 and held at
the lower level, while procurement prices for agricultural goods were
being allowed to drift up.
Table 2 shows price indices for 1928-32 in all the main markets in
which urban-rural trade took place. Only in 1930 did state and co-
operative retail prices for manufactures retailed in the village begin to
rise significantly by comparison with state procurement prices for farm
products. From this it might be supposed that the conservative public
sector pricing policy pursued up until collectivisation stemmed from an
appreciation of Preobrazhensky’s dilemma - that pushing up industrial
prices would spark off a peasant grain strike; once this fear had been
lifted by the first wave of collectivisation in 1929-30, industrial prices in
the village could be allowed to rise. Both suppositions would be wrong.
Table 2. Price Indices, 1928-32
1928 = 100 1929 1930 1931 1932
Producer prices for
agricultural goods:
Centrally planned procurements 111 116 119 109
Decentralised procurements … … … 354
Free market sales 233 525 814 3006
Weighted producer prices 117 180 199 314
Rural purchase prices
for industrial goods:
Investment goods 100 100 100 100
State and co-operative retail 101 110 134 292
Free market retail 111 174 313 674
Weighted user prices 101 110 171 241
Source: Taken or calculated from A. A. Barsov [1969], Balans
stoimostnykh obmenov mezhdu gorodom i derevnei, Moscow: 108, 112-
113, 115, 123.
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First, it is true that before collectivisation peasants had begun to
withhold sales of foodstuffs (especially grains) from state procurement
agencies, but the reason was not the adverse terms of trade, which were
improving. The reason was that the ambitious public sector investment
programme was inflating household purchasing power in both town
and country beyond the capacity of consumer industries to satisfy it.
Lack of availability of consumer goods forced the seller of foodstuffs to
accumulate useless cash, and constituted a disincentive to sell. One
solution would have been for the authorities to restrain public sector
investment, but this had been ruled out by Stalin. Another option
would have been to allow public sector industrial prices to rise. This
would have restored macroeconomic equilibrium and food producers’
marketing incentives, at the cost of making explicit the reduced living
standards required by the public sector investment programme; again
this was politically unacceptable.7 While ruling out both of these
options, the authorities instead followed a third alternative which made
matters still worse. This was to try to reduce peasant incomes and the
cost of public sector investment by pushing down the demand price of
grains in the grain market, which they largely controlled through
procurement agencies, although they could not prevent the demand
prices for other kinds of agricultural outputs from rising in the
comparatively unregulated markets for livestock and dairy produce,
vegetables etc. As a result farmers diverted resources from grain
cultivation into these other, more profitable activities; the agricultural
system benefited, farm incomes were not reduced, and the supply of
grains to the public sector was disproportionately hindered [Davies,
1980: 40].
Second, was collectivisation the decisive factor which allowed the
authorities at last to squeeze the peasantry by manipulation of the
scissors? It is true that after 1930 the public sector retail prices for
industrial goods rose faster than state procurement prices for farm
products, but the impact of this development upon the supply of funds
for public sector accumulation in industry was more than offset by
other changes. One offsetting factor lay in unregulated exchanges
within the private sector which persisted (at times illegally) throughout
this period. Prices for private sales of foodstuffs and purchases of
manufactures both multiplied several times between 1928 and 1932,
absolutely and relative to prices obtained in the public sector. But (see
Table 2) the free market price of foodstuffs rose by 30 times, compared
to only six or seven times for free market manufactures. The
persistence of a private sector within agriculture and trade was to have
a major effect on the flow of funds between agriculture and industry.
For, although virtually all households became worse off, those
households which still had access to private supplies of foodstuffs or
artisan products could trade on advantageous terms with households
7 If anything, state policy was still to hold industrial prices down,
with consequences analysed by Vyas [1979: 26-7]. For more detailed
analysis see Harrison [1984: 76-8].
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reliant on the public sector for their incomes, and best of all was to
have food for sale.
The other offset to public sector manipulation of the scissors lay in
the fact that, with the creation of a public sector in agriculture,
investment in farm capacity now became a charge on public sector
resources. At the same time the damage done by collectivisation, in
particular widespread losses of draught livestock, had to be made up by
the transfer of farm machinery at subsidised state wholesale prices to
new public sector agricultural enterprises called “machine and tractor
stations”; these transfers were not compensated by immediate
reductions in farm household purchasing power.
Why, then, was collectivisation undertaken? Since it was not
required to resolve Preobrazhensky’s dilemma, and did not increase the
resources available to finance industrialisation, it has been argued that
the only remaining motives were to back up Stalin’s struggle for
personal power and to suppress the consequences of leadership
blunders such as the attempt to hold down grain prices from 1926
onwards [e.g. Millar, 1976: 53-5]. This view exaggerates what could
have been achieved within the NEP framework. The high level of public
sector investment being pursued in the late 1920s was increasingly
incompatible with NEP, given the right (enshrined in NEP) of the
peasant farmer to command resources for agriculture and
consumption. To this extent the growing state of shortage and
macroeconomic disequilibrium was inevitable [Wheatcroft, Davies and
Cooper, 1982:32]. The Soviet regime was in the process of formulating
a definite intention to make the transition away from a demand-
constrained economic system to a resource-constrained economy
characterised by “expansion drive” and “investment hunger” [e.g.
Kornai, 1980:191-5], and the market relation with the peasantry would
have suffered under any policy design, no matter how finely calculated.
At the same time the choice of methods and rate of collectivisation
undoubtedly reflected specific features of nascent Stalinism - its
impatient desire to get things done, its intolerance of constraints and
pragmatic willingness to substitute coercion for consent - with results
tragic for agriculture and the rural population. The collectivisation
drive was also characterised by highly exaggerated expectations about
what would prove technically possible in a large-scale, socialised
agriculture given the short time horizon and extremely limited public
sector investment resources available for farming, and these
expectations would be disappointed in a most brutal clash with reality
[Davies, 1980: Chapter 10].
When we take into account the volumes of resources being
transferred between the different sectors through different markets,
what was the net impact upon Soviet primary accumulation? Research
has concentrated on the net transfer between agriculture and industry,
rather than between the private and public sectors. The pioneer in this
field, the Soviet economist A. A. Barsov [1969: Table 10 (facing p. 112)
and p. 118], has calculated that during collectivisation the commodity
terms of trade moved in favour of agriculture, although the extent of
this movement proved highly unstable in the short term. When the
resource transfers themselves are valued in constant 1928 prices, it is
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claimed that agriculture received subsidies from industry throughout
the period 1928-32, and that the net subsidy tended to increase while
collectivisation proceeded. This result should no longer be considered
surprising, given that 17 years have passed since its first publication in
a Soviet journal in 1968.
Barsov’s findings have been criticised on various grounds. Alec
Nove [1976: 58] has called into question whether such flows are in
principle measurable, given the turmoil of Soviet economic reality in
these years. Another area for criticism has been Barsov’s reliance
(understandable, however, under the circumstances) on Soviet official
statistics [Morrison, 1982: 577-80].
On a more practical level, R. W. Davies and S.G. Wheatcroft have
suggested that Barsov neglected the role of rural non-agriculture in
claiming agricultural resources and supplying the agricultural
population. Empirically, Barsov may have conflated agriculture with
the village and the private sector, and public sector urban non-
agriculture with non-agriculture as a whole. The importance of this lies
in the role played by private sector rural non-agriculture before 1930,
and its rapid elimination in the course of farm collectivisation.
Table 3. Agriculture’s Sales and Receipts, 1928-32
Billion 1928 roubles 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932
Agriculture’s sales to non-agriculture:
To urban non-agriculture (1) 3.2 3.5 4.0 4.2 3.2
To all non-agriculture (2) 3.4 4.0 3.9 .. ..
Residual attributable to rural
non-agriculture (2 – 1) 0.2 0.5 .. .. ..
Agriculture’s purchases from non-agriculture:
Investment goods from urban
non-agriculture (3) 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.4 1.4
Consumer goods from urban
non-agriculture (4) 3.4 4.1 4.4 3.7 3.3
Consumer goods from all non-
agriculture 5.8 6.4 6.4 .. ..
Residual attributable to rural
non-agriculture (5 – 4) 2.4 2.3 2.0 .. ..
Agriculture’s net transfer to non-agriculture:
To urban non-agriculture (6) –0.8 –1.3 –1.3 –1.0 –1.6
To all non-agriculture (7) –3.0 –3.1 –3.4 .. ..
Residual attributable to rural
non-agriculture (7 – 6) –2.2 –1.8 –2.0 .. ..
Source: Rows 1, 3, 4 and 6 are from A. A. Barsov [1969], Balans
stoimostnykh obmenov mezhdu gorodom i derevnei, Moscow: Table 10
(facing p. 112) and p. 118. Rows 2 and 5 are from R.W. Davies and S.G.
Wheatcroft [1983], “Soviet National Income Accounts (Balances) for
1928-30: A Rare Historical Source,” Centre for Russian and East
European Studies, University of Birmingham: 21-2.
The impact of adopting Davies and Wheatcroft’s revisions is shown
in Table 3. The role of rural non-agriculture emerges as a set of
residuals between two sets of data which may not be fully comparable
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in other ways than those of which we are aware, so it is important not
to place too much weight on their accuracy. The table suggests,
however, that before collectivisation rural non-agriculture made a
substantial net contribution to agriculture - much larger than the urban
non-agricultural subsidy - when product flows are measured in 1928
prices. Thus, Barsov greatly understated the flow of resources from
industry as a whole to agriculture in 1928-30. The subsequent
elimination of rural industries may thus be said to have had two
negative consequences — it was a directly retrograde step from the
point of view of industrialisation; indirectly it must have increased the
dependence of the agricultural population upon the products of public
sector urban industries, without increasing the availability of
agricultural products. From the point of view of primary socialist
accumulation the trade-off between living standards and public sector
investment was worsened. But at the same time the elimination of rural
industries directly increased the economic weight of the public sector.
Barsov [1969: 130-31; 1974] has also prepared an alternative
evaluation of the transfer of resources between agriculture and industry
for 1928-32 and 1937-38 in terms of what Michael Ellman [7975] calls
“labour adjusted roubles.” This involves correction of 1928 prices for
the overvaluation of a unit of industrial labour-time in 1928 compared
to a unit of agricultural labour-time and for changes in labour
productivity after 1928 in both sectors. The prices of 1928 are rejected
as a measure of value because they still incorporated the pre-
revolutionary heritage of exploitation of the agricultural producer by
state monopoly capital by means of adverse terms of trade. Barsov
estimates the extent of this discrimination as an overvaluation of
industrial commodities (and of the labour-time embodied in them) at
1928 prices by a factor of two. In subsequent years this factor would be
increased by an increase in labour productivity in agriculture, and
reduced by an increase in the same in industry, so Barsov makes
appropriate adjustments in the valuation of commodities produced in
both sectors in subsequent years (this would be equivalent to correcting
the 1928 correction by an index of the double-factoral terms of trade).8
8 Barsov [1969:35-50, 125-9] sets out the methodology for
correcting 1928 prices. Objections have been raised on a variety of
grounds. Millar [1974: 752] objected to the Marxian antecedents of
“labour-adjusted” roubles in the labour theory of value, which Millar
interpreted as a welfare theory of claims on output. Millar
distinguished between the supposedly “straightforward empirical
measurement” of intersectoral resource flows, and the measurement of
their welfare implications, which requires “choice of a value standard.”
This distinction does not seem very satisfactory since even
conventional neoclassical economics requires an appropriate value
standard for measuring inter-sectoral resource flows — in this case,
some indicator of long-run marginal costs obtainable under a perfectly
competitive equilibrium. Another criticism is raised by Morrison
[1982:570-77] - he claims that Barsov’s corrections of 1928 prices both
distort the Soviet labour productivity record and amount to a
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Table 4 shows the results. When commodity flows are revalued in
this way, it emerges that agriculture suffered from unequal exchange
throughout the period, but an adverse shift in the terms of trade (the
“ratio of non-equivalence”) was secured only for 1929-31; by 1932 the
labour-adjusted “scissors” were already more favourable than in 1928,
and the favourable trend persisted to the late 1930s.
Table 4. Agriculture’s Labour-Adjusted Sales and Receipts in 1913,
1928-32 and 1937-38
Billion labour-adjusted
roubles 1913 1928
1929-31
average 1932
1937-8
average
Agriculture’s sales to
non-agriculture (1) 5.54 3.71 4.76 3.78 3.49
Agriculture’s purchases
from non-agriculture (2) 1.72 1.84 2.17 1.95 2.15
Ratio of non-equivalence
(1÷2) 3.22 2.02 2.19 1.94 1.63
Agriculture’s net transfer
to non-agriculture (1 -2) 3.82 1.87 2.58 1.83 1.35
(1-2) as share of
agricultural output 0.36 0.19 0.29 0.22 0.16
(1-2) as share of
industrial investment .. 0.54 0.37 0.18 0.16
Note: Labour-adjusted roubles are defined in the text.
Source: A. A. Barsov [1974], “NEP i vyravnivanie ekonomicheskikh
otnoshenii mezhdu gorodom i derevnei,” in Novaya ekonomicheskaya
politika: voprosy teorii i istorii, Moscow: 96, 99.
Industry did after all receive a net “tribute” from agriculture
throughout the inter-war period (this is the result of Barsov’s radical
downvaluation of industry’s sales to agriculture), and the tribute was
larger in 1929-31 than in 1928. But the increase in the tribute during
collectivisation was only small and temporary. By 1932 it had fallen
back to below the 1928 level, and was smaller still in 1937-38 - there
legitimation of wastefully high unit costs in Soviet industry. Again this
criticism seems to attach unnecessary moral connotations to a useful
heuristic device. Even conventional neoclassical economics recognises
the concepts of labour embodied and labour commanded, as definition
of the “double-factoral terms of trade” reveals. (The commodity terms
of trade are measured by an index of the price of exports divided by an
index of the price of imports. The single-factoral terms of trade are
measured by the commodity terms of trade multiplied by an index of
labour productivity in the export industries of the exporting country, so
that a deterioration in the commodity terms of trade may be offset by a
reduction in the labour embodied in the exporting country’s exports.
The double-factoral terms of trade are measured by the single-factoral
terms of trade divided by an index of labour productivity in the export
industries of trading partners, so that a deterioration in the single
factoral terms of trade may be offset by an increase in the labour
commanded by exports and embodied in imports.)
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was no recovery after the post-collectivisation famine. As a proportion
of industrial accumulation the agricultural tribute declined steadily,
from 54 per cent in 1928 to only 18 per cent in 1932 and 16 per cent in
1937-38.
The main emphasis of Barsov’s research was placed on resource
transfers between industry and agriculture. This is not the same as the
focus of primary socialist accumulation which rests on the public sector
and its relation with the private sector. However, Barsov’s research has
been extended to reveal major aspects of primary accumulation. One
aspect of this lay in the differential treatment of different sectors within
agriculture. In 1928 almost all of agriculture was in small peasant
hands. In 1929-30 a large but at first highly unstable socialised sector
was formed. By 1932 more than 60 per cent, and by 1937 more than 90
per cent of peasant farms had been collectivised; a substantial
nationalised farming industry had also been created. Table 5 shows
that in 1930-31 the labour-adjusted (double-factoral) terms of trade
were only marginally less favourable to agriculture as a whole than in
1928, and those for the private sector tended to follow those for
agriculture as a whole or remain slightly more favourable. Nationalised
state farms were far more favourably treated; their terms of trade were
twice to four times as advantageous. Collective farms were enormously
discriminated against; taking into account the unfavourable terms on
which they rented machinery services from the state-owned machine
and tractor stations attached to them, their terms of trade with non-
agriculture were 14 times less advantageous than those facing state
farms in the worst year of 1931, and more than three times as bad as
those facing agriculture as a whole. In subsequent years (we have only
1932 and 1938) this pattern of discrimination moderated. But by 1938,
although state farms had lost their advantage, the private sector had
improved its position and collective farms were still twice as badly
treated as agriculture as a whole. In short, although collectivisation
failed to secure more than a small and short-lived increase in the net
transfer of resources (measured in labour-adjusted roubles) out of
agriculture as a whole, it created new sectors within agriculture and
treated them differently. State-owned farms and machine and tractor
stations were subsidised at the expense of collective farms; an
incidental, and unintended beneficiary was the remaining private
sector.
Table 5. The Labour-Adjusted Terms of Trade, 1930-32 and 1938
Ratios of nonequivalence 1930 1931 1932 1938
State farms 0.82 0.55 0.51 1.92
Collective farms (including machine
and tractor stations) 4.22 4.46 2.82 1.37
Collective farms alone 4.75 7.75 4.64 3.17
Private farms 1.90 2.11 1.91 1.23
All agriculture 2.04 2.31 1.94 1.64
Note: The ratio of non-equivalence is defined as sales divided by
purchases when both are measured in labour-adjusted roubles.
Source: Barsov [1974: 101].
19
Ellman [1975:856] has also extended Barsov’s research to examine
changes in relations of production within industry, but covering only
the years 1928-32. He starts from the proposition that if the net
transfer from agriculture to industry fell over the period of the first Five
Year Plan, then the increase in industrial investment over the period
must have been financed in some other way. He finds its source in the
increase in the industrial workforce, coupled with the decline in the real
wage cost of output (the latter mainly accounted for by the decline in
the real wage). In labour-adjusted value terms it transpires that 30 per
cent of the increase in industrial accumulation resulted from the
increase in absolute surplus value resulting from increased
employment; the increase in relative surplus value resulting from the
lower wage cost of output was sufficient to make good both the
remaining 70 per cent of the increase in industrial accumulation, and a
further 31 per cent shortfall resulting from the decline in the
agricultural surplus. The increase in employment was made possible by
the administrative mobilisation of resources into public sector capital
construction, the imposition of an obligation to work upon the adult
able-bodied population of the towns, and the flood of former peasants
who left the village to seek work for a wage income.9 The lower wage
cost of output was made possible by a reduction in the real wage paid to
both existing and newly employed workers, enforced through inflation,
queues, ration cards and the differentiation of rewards for more skilled
and responsible grades. All this took place in the context of
restructuring of public sector managerial relations of production on the
basis of more hierarchical, centralised authority.
Associated with the resource flows and reorganisation of the period
were large-scale social mobility and migration. Between 1928 and 1940
state employment almost tripled, with the creation of 20 million new
jobs. Until some point in the late 1930s, most new recruits to public
sector industry were of peasant origin; of the rural recruits, most were
young and without previous experience of non-agricultural wage
employment. Other recruits to urban non-agriculture were
predominantly women, who increasingly added jobs in the public
sector to housework and childcare responsibilities; and school-leavers,
who contributed to the natural increase in the workforce.
9 Ellman [1975:857] has argued that, although there was no increase
in the net agricultural surplus, the mobilisation both of wage goods
marketed by agriculture and of peasant labour was still made possible
by farm collectivisation. To this extent collectivisation might still be
seen not only as an act of primary accumulation in itself, but also as a
necessary condition for the further process of primary accumulation in
industry. However Millar [1984] has argued that collectivisation itself
was not a necessary condition for the mobilisation of basic wage goods
or of labour into industry; once collectivisation had done the damage,
the procurements system for basic wage goods (and presumably, too,
the system of controls over rural labour mobility and recruitment)
merely limited the adverse results.
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The mobilisation of rural labour for public sector capital
construction was an exceptionally bewildering affair for those
participating in it. Permanent migration from country to town could
hold many advantages for the migrant. In general urban living
standards were higher than in the countryside, not least because
supplies were more assured in times of shortage. Thus, even when
living standards were collapsing everywhere, as in the early 1930s, the
rural-urban migrant could still benefit. Opportunities for advancement
and promotion were also far more numerous in the urban setting, and
the hardworking, politically conscious would-be official would almost
inevitably leave the village at some point. However, movement to the
towns was also fraught with obstacles. Employment as a gang labourer
on a building site in a new town which might still be no more than mud
and fields was likely to carry more privations than privileges.
Opportunities for individual advancement might still be beyond reach.
The regime had a multiplying need for cadres and officials, but there
was a need for scapegoats too. At lower levels the chance of promotion
exceeded the likelihood of personal disaster by some margin, but with
rapid advancement up the public sector administrative hierarchy the
margin disappeared or at times became negative.
Many were mobilised involuntarily, and entered the field of public
sector capital construction as forced labour. Again, the peasantry
provided the first echelon for the large-scale application of forced
labour - those interned in the course of collectivisation and the
agricultural campaigns of the first Five Year Plan. Unfortunately this is
a subject where quantification is most difficult. For the most precise
estimates tend also to be the most exaggerated, and more sober experts
are reluctant to be precise (e.g. Rosefielde [7950] and accompanying
discussion).
In summary, what were the defining features of Soviet primary
accumulation after 1928? First, in labour-adjusted roubles agriculture
financed a significant but declining proportion of public sector
accumulation through unequal exchange. Second, the price “scissors”
or terms of trade between industry and agriculture proved resistant to
administrative controls and failed to move in a way which would pay
for the increase in industrial investment, although they were
successfully manipulated to benefit nationalised enterprise at the
expense of collective farming within public sector agriculture. Third,
trends in the exchange of commodities and terms of trade were
incidental to establishment of the decisive condition for Soviet primary
accumulation the administrative mobilisation of resources - products
and labour - into public sector capital construction of large-scale
industrial projects, which was carried out regardless of the
consequences for market equilibrium or incentives for small producers.
Fourth, the administrative mobilisation of products on this scale would
have necessitated changes in agricultural organisation whatever
happened, and farm collectivisation was itself a major act of primary
accumulation; however, contrary to received opinion, the
collectivisation process did not additionally give rise to the expanded
flow of products to be mobilised. Fifth, the main constituents of Soviet
primary accumulation were the collectivisation of peasant farming and
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its subordination to state enterprise within public sector agriculture,
the elimination of private sector small-scale rural industries, the
rationing of industrial investment resources exclusively to the public
sector and their denial to private enterprise, and the associated
movement of millions of workers out of the household and private
sector to employment in public sector capital construction at a reduced
real wage. From this point of view, the real process of Soviet primary
accumulation had more in common with the mobilisation of labour
envisaged by Bukharin in 1920, than with the products transfer urged
by Preobrazhcnsky in 1924-26. Sixth, the viability of public sector
expansion on this basis was underpinned by the transformation of
public sector managerial relations of production and of the economic
system as a whole on hierarchical, authoritarian lines.
VI. Lessons
The experience of Soviet primary accumulation contains several lessons
of significance for other developing countries engaged in a transition to
socialism. First, primary socialist accumulation goes far beyond the
issues of industry versus agriculture, worker versus peasant or town
versus village. Soviet primary accumulation brought about radical
change within industry and within agriculture, not just in the relations
between them; it drastically altered the lives of both workers and
peasants, and of both town and country. Even the issue of public versus
private enterprise does not sum it up because the nature of the public
sector was also profoundly transformed. Thus, even if primary socialist
accumulation sometimes appears to narrow itself down to
comparatively technical issues such as the pricing of industrial and
agricultural commodities, decisions taken on such a narrow basis may
turn out to have implications reaching far beyond what was anticipated.
Second, primary socialist accumulation is not a deterministic
concept. There is no one course which all developing countries must
follow. Within Soviet experience the concept of primary socialist
accumulation acquired several different meanings. However, primary
socialist accumulation from below, relying on a mixture of worker and
community initiatives, co-operative forms and economic methods,
appeared less attractive to those in charge of the Soviet political system
than primary socialist accumulation enforced from above through
administrative mobilisation of resources and the centralisation of
authority.
Third, the Soviet pattern of primary socialist accumulation proved
viable and had a number of beneficial results. Bukharin and others who
had argued that the Soviet state could not launch a confrontation with a
hundred million peasants and dispense with their goodwill were proved
wrong by Stalin and his colleagues. In the short term this primary
accumulation pattern was associated with a sharp deterioration in the
quality of life for most Soviet citizens. In the long term, however, an
economic system was built which gave rise to full employment, rising
living standards and a high degree of economic security for nearly
everyone, at least in peacetime conditions. What is more, a Soviet
military-economic counterweight to Western imperial pretensions was
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established, without which many of the options for non-capitalist
development open to developing countries today would be out of the
question.
Fourth, Soviet primary socialist accumulation had many unintended
results. Among these were the economic losses resulting from the
uncontrolled style of resource mobilisation (including the speed and
methods of farm collectivisation), the associated costs of
underestimating inertia and reluctance or resistance down below in the
face of higher-level directives and decrees, the multiplication and
overburdening of centralised administrative controls on economic life,
the hyperactivity of the state security organs and proliferation of
purges, the spread of forced labour and widespread alienation of
working people (especially peasants) from socialist goals. At each stage
governmental coercion, first embraced as a temporary expedient or
necessary evil, became permanently institutionalised and hailed as a
proper characteristic of socialist construction.
Fifth, these features of Soviet primary socialist accumulation meant
that the process proved extremely difficult to complete. Even today
some aspects of the primary phase persist. The private sector continues
to play an irreducible role in Soviet agriculture and trade. Within the
public sector an informal economy based on the use of public assets for
private gain persists and cannot be eliminated in spite of decrees and
directives. Rapid industrialisation has been successfully carried out, yet
many elements of the pre-socialist, preindustrial economy have been
carried over into the Soviet workplace and urban community - labour
indiscipline and migrancy, concealed unemployment, archaic controls
on information, culture and popular decision-making. Thus the means
originally chosen for building a socialist society turn out to have
incorporated unexpected limits on the attainment of the original goal.
Sixth, although the Soviet pattern of primary socialist accumulation
was not economically predetermined but resulted from political choice,
this choice has proved extremely difficult to revise after the event. Right
from the start important sections of Soviet society and public opinion,
including influential groups at the heart of the Stalinist political system,
were ready to have second thoughts and urge a shift to a less coercive
path of primary accumulation with more scope for socialist
construction and economic development from below. From time to
time they were able to secure significant constraints on the actions of
Soviet officialdom and, after the death of Stalin these constraints
became permanent. But the basic institutions and mechanisms of rule
already laid down had meanwhile become strongly entrenched and
today remain powerfully resistant to any more fundamental reform.
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